In 1985 the second author showed that if there is a proper class of measurable Woodin cardinals and V B 1 and V B 2 are generic extensions of V satisfying CH then V B 1 and V B 2 agree on all Σ 2 1 -statements. In terms of the strong logic Ω-logic this can be reformulated by saying that under the above large cardinal assumption ZFC + CH is Ω-complete for Σ 2 1 . Moreover, CH is the unique Σ 2 1 -statement with this feature in the sense that any other Σ 2 1 -statement with this feature is Ω-equivalent to CH over ZFC. It is natural to look for other strengthenings of ZFC that have an even greater degree of Ω-completeness. For example, one can ask for recursively enumerable axioms A such that relative to large cardinal axioms ZFC + A is Ω-complete for all of third-order arithmetic. Going further, for each specifiable segment V λ of the universe of sets (for example, one might take V λ to be the least level that satisfies there is a proper class of huge cardinals), one can ask for recursively enumerable axioms A such that relative to large cardinal axioms ZFC + A is Ω-complete for the theory of V λ . If such theories exist, extend one another, and are unique in the sense that any other such theory B with the same level of Ω-completeness as A is actually Ω-equivalent to A over ZFC, then this would show that there is a unique Ω-complete picture of the successive fragments of the universe of sets and it would make for a very strong case for axioms complementing large cardinal axioms. In this paper we show that uniqueness must fail. In particular, we show that if there is one such theory that Ω-implies CH then there is another that Ω-implies ¬CH. * We would like to thank the referee for helpful comments.
In this paper we consider a very optimistic scenario for extending the axioms of ZFC to diminish independence and we show that this scenario must fail. In Section 1 we motivate the scenario by discussing some developments in the search for new axioms. In Section 2 we give a brief overview of Ω-logic and describe the scenario. In Section 3 we prove our main result. The reader who understands the above abstract and is not in need of motivation can turn directly to Section 2.
Independence and New Axioms
The independence results in set theory have shown that many basic questions of mathematics cannot be settled on the basis of the standard axioms of mathematics, ZFC. Two classical examples of such statements are PM (the statement that all projective sets are Lebesgue measurable) and CH (Cantor's continuum hypothesis). The first concerns the structure of second-order arithmetic while the second concerns third-order arithmetic. Both of these problems were intensively investigated during the early era of set theory but no progress was made. The explanation for this was ultimately provided by results of Gödel and Cohen. Gödel constructed an inner model L of V that satisfies ¬PM and CH. Cohen complemented this by constructing an outer model (or forcing extension) V B of V that satisfies ¬CH. Solovay combined these techniques and, assuming an inaccessible cardinal, constructed a model of ZFC in which PM holds. Together these results show that it is in principle impossible to either prove or refute these statements on the basis of the standard axioms of mathematics, ZFC. But this simply raises the question of whether these statements are absolutely undecidable, that is, undecidable relative to any collection of justified axioms.
To show that such statements are not absolutely undecidable one must find and justify new axioms that settle the undecided statements. This program has both a mathematical component and a philosophical component. On the mathematical side one must find axioms which are sufficient for the task. On the philosophical side one must show that these axioms are indeed justified. These are not unrelated components. For, on the one hand, philosophical considerations serve as a guide to the initial formulation of the axioms and, on the other hand, the ultimate case for justification will inevitably rest on a network of mathematical results.
In the case of the first problem (and, more generally, a vast array of other problems in second-order arithmetic) there has been remarkable success. We now have axioms that settle PM (affirmatively) and which admit of a strong justification. In fact there are two classes of such axioms-axioms of definable determinacy and large cardinal axioms (or axioms of infinity). These axioms spring from entirely different sources and, in addition to resolving PM and many other questions of second-order arithmetic, these axioms are intimately connected. In the remainder of this introduction we will give a brief sketch of these developments, with the aim of motivating the main results on the prospect of bifurcation at the level of CH.
Large Cardinal Axioms and Axioms of Definable Determinacy
Large cardinal axioms are (roughly speaking) generalizations of the axioms of extent of ZFC-Infinity and Replacement-in that they assert that there are large levels of the universe of sets. Examples of such axioms are those asserting the existence of strongly inaccessible cardinals, Woodin cardinals, and supercompact cardinals. Axioms of definable determinacy can also be seen as generalizations of a principle inherent in ZFC, namely, Borel determinacy, which was shown to be a theorem of ZFC by Martin. Examples of such axioms are PD (the statement that all projective sets are determined) and AD L(R) (the statement that all sets of reals in L(R) are determined). Large cardinal axioms and axioms of definable determinacy are (in many cases) intrinsically plausible but the strongest case for their justification comes through their fruitful consequences, their connections with each other, and an intricate network of theorems relating them to other axioms. We will touch on some of these developments but will necessarily have to be brief.
1
Let us start with fruitful consequences. In ZFC one can develop a remarkable structure theory for the Borel sets; for example, all such sets are Lebesgue measurable and have the property of Baire. The principle of Borel determinacy lies at the heart of this structure theory and PD lifts this structure theory from the Borel sets to the projective sets, while AD L(R) lifts it further to the sets of reals in L(R), which lie in a transfinite extension of the projective hierarchy. Not only do PD and AD L(R) lift the structure theory to their respective domains, they appear to be "effectively complete" for their respective realms. A comparison with PA is useful here. In contrast to the case of PA there are many statements of prior mathematical interest concerning second-order arithmetic that are not settled by second-order Peano Arithmetic, PA 2 . For example, PM is such a statement. When one adds (schematic) PD to PA 2 this ceases to be the case. In fact, PA 2 +PD appears to be more complete for second-order arithmetic than PA is for first-order arithmetic, in that there is no analogue of the type of result uncovered in [18] . Similar considerations apply to AD L(R) . Let us turn now to the fruitful consequences of large cardinal axioms. Since these principles assert the existence of very large sets there is perhaps little reason to expect that they will have significant consequences for secondand third-order arithmetic. Of course, we know from the incompleteness phenomenon that they yield new Π 0 1 -statements and so have consequences for first-order arithmetic. Gödel had much higher expectations for large cardinal axioms, thinking that they had significant consequences for secondand third-order arithmetic. Indeed he went so far as to entertain a kind of generalized completeness theorem for large cardinal axioms:
It is not impossible that for such a concept of demonstrability [namely, provability from true large cardinal axioms] some completeness theorem would hold which would say that every proposition expressible in set theory is decidable from the present axioms plus some true assertion about the largeness of the universe of all sets. The connection between Woodin cardinals and axioms of definable determinacy is much deeper-axioms of definable determinacy are in fact equivalent to the existence of certain inner models of Woodin cardinals: Theorem 1.6 (Woodin). The following are equivalent:
(1) PD (Schematic).
(2) For every n < ω, there is a fine-structural, countably iterable inner model M such that M "There are n Woodin cardinals". Theorem 1.7 (Woodin). The following are equivalent:
(2) In L(R), for every set S of ordinals, there is an inner model M and an α < ω
such that S ∈ M and M "α is a Woodin cardinal ".
Let us return to the issues of "fruitful consequences" and "effective completeness". We mentioned earlier that axioms of definable determinacy lift the structure theory of the Borel sets to higher levels. One concern might be that there are other, incompatible axioms that also have this consequence. However, one can show that in certain cases, for example, the case of L(R), one cannot have the structure theory without having definable determinacy: Theorem 1.8 (Woodin) . Assume that every set of reals in L(R) is Lebesgue measurable and has the property of Baire and assume Σ 
Further, much stronger, evidence that AD L(R) is giving the correct theory of the sets of reals in L(R) lies in the network of theorems supporting the claim that all sufficiently strong "natural" theories imply AD L(R) . This occurs even in cases where the theories are logically incompatible. So AD L(R) appears to lie in the overlapping consensus of all sufficiently strong "natural" theories.
The "effective completeness" of large cardinal axioms for the theory of the sets of reals in L(R) and, in fact, all of L(R) can be quantified. Our main technique for establishing independence in set theory is the powerful technique of set-forcing. But in the presence of Woodin cardinals this technique cannot be used to establish independence of statements concerning L(R). Woodin cardinals "seal" or "freeze" the theory of L(R). Put otherwise, the theory of L(R) is generically absolute in the presence of Woodin cardinals. Theorem 1.9 (Woodin [12] ). Assume there is a proper class of Woodin cardinals. Suppose ϕ is a sentence, P is a partial order and
This situation generalizes beyond L(R) and, in a sense which can be made precise, holds strictly "below" Σ 2 1 , the level of CH.
An Optimistic Scenario
Our goal now is to investigate how far generic absoluteness extends. To this end it will be useful to reformulate generic absoluteness in terms of a strong logic that is designed to factor out the effects of set-forcing.
Ω-Logic
We begin by introducing the semantic consequence relation of Ω-logic and then turn to the quasi-syntactic proof relation that aims to capture it.
3
Definition 2.1. Suppose that T is a countable theory in the language of set theory and ϕ is a sentence. Then if for all complete Boolean algebras B and for all ordinals α,
This notion of semantic implication is robust in that large cardinal axioms imply that the question of what implies what cannot be altered by forcing:
. Assume ZFC and that there is a proper class of Woodin cardinals. Suppose that T is a countable theory in the language of set theory and ϕ is a sentence. Then for all complete Boolean algebras B,
We say that a statement or theory T is Ω-satisfiable if there exists an ordinal α and a complete Boolean algebra B such that V B α
T . It follows immediately from the above that Ω-satisfiability is also generically invariant. To underscore just how remarkable this is we note the following consequence: Suppose that there is a proper class of Woodin cardinals and let ϕ be a Σ 2 -sentence. The statement that ϕ holds in a generic extension is generically absolute. For example, suppose that ϕ is the Σ 2 -statement asserting that there is a huge cardinal. Let V B be a generic extension where the huge cardinal is collapsed. It follows from the above that it is possible to further force to "resurrect" the huge cardinal, that is, there is a further forcing extension V B * C containing a huge cardinal. To introduce the "syntactic" proof relation which aims to capture the above semantic notion we first need to introduce the notion of a universally Baire set of reals. Definition 2.3. Suppose A ⊆ ω ω and δ is a cardinal. The set A is δ-universally Baire if for all partial orders P of cardinality δ there exist trees S and T in ω × κ for some κ such that
The set A is universally Baire if it is δ-universally Baire for all δ.
Universally Baire sets have canonical interpretations in generic exten-
. It is straightforward to see (using the absoluteness of well-foundedness) that A G is independent of the choice of T and S. See [4] for further details. 
Definition 2.5. Suppose that there is a proper class of Woodin cardinals, T is a countable theory in the language of set theory and ϕ is a sentence. Then T Ω ϕ iff there exists a set A ⊆ ω ω such that
(1) A is universally Baire, and (2) for all countable transitive models M , if M is strongly A-closed and
Like the semantic notion of consequence, this notion of provability is robust under large cardinal assumptions: Theorem 2.6 (Woodin). Assume there is a proper class of Woodin cardinals. Suppose T is a countable theory in the language of set theory, ϕ is a sentence, and B is a complete Boolean algebra. Then
Thus, we have a semantic consequence relation and a quasi-syntactic proof relation, both of which are robust under the assumption of large cardinal axioms. It is natural to ask whether the soundness and completeness theorems hold. The soundness theorem is known to hold: Theorem 2.7 (Woodin). Suppose T is a countable theory in the language of set theory and ϕ is a sentence. If
It is open whether the completeness theorem holds for Ω-logic. 
We shall need to introduce a strengthening of this conjecture.
Definition 2.9 (AD + Conjecture). Suppose that A and B are sets of reals such that L(A, R) and L(B, R) satisfy AD + . Suppose every set
is ω 1 -universally Baire. Then either As we shall see this conjecture has profound meta-mathematical consequences.
Ω-Complete Theories
We are now in a position to reformulate generic absoluteness in terms of Ω-logic. Definition 2.11. A theory T is Ω-complete for a collection of sentences Γ if for each ϕ ∈ Γ, T Ω ϕ or T Ω ¬ϕ.
Remark 2.12. Notice that we are allowing the degenerate case in which T is not Ω-satisfiable, in which case both of the above implications hold. In particular, the theory ZFC + 0 = 1 is trivially Ω-complete for any Γ. This choice is merely one of convenience and, of course, in all cases of interest there will be sufficient large cardinals to ensure that the theory will be Ω-satisfiable.
The result on the generic absoluteness of L(R) (Theorem 1.9) can now be reformulated as follows: Theorem 2.13 (Woodin) . Assume ZFC and that there is a proper class of Woodin cardinals. Then ZFC is Ω-complete for the collection of sentences of the form "L(R) ϕ".
Although we have stated the Ω-completeness with respect to ZFC the large cardinals are really doing the work. For this reason it is perhaps more transparent to formulate the result by saying that "ZFC + there is a proper class of Woodin cardinals" is Ω-complete for the collection of sentences of the form "L(R) ϕ", noting that under this formulation the stated Ω-completeness is trivial unless our background assumptions guarantee that "ZFC + there is a proper class of Woodin cardinals" is Ω-satisfiable.
The above result is thus a partial realization of Gödel's conjectured completeness theorem for large cardinal axioms, only now we are invoking a stronger logic and we only have completeness at the level of L(R). Unfortunately, it follows from a series of results originating with Levy and Solovay that the current generation of large cardinal axioms are not Ω-complete at the level of third-order arithmetic, in fact, they are not Ω-complete at the level of Σ 2 1 , which is the complexity of CH.
Theorem 2.14. Assume L is a standard large cardinal axiom. Then ZFC+L is not Ω-complete for Σ This theorem is stated informally since the notion of a "standard large cardinal axiom" is not precise. However, one can cite examples from across the large cardinal hierarchy. For example, for L one can take "there is a measurable cardinal", "there is a proper class of Woodin cardinals", "there is a non-trivial embedding j : L(V λ+1 ) → L(V λ+1 ) with critical point below λ". See [14] , [7] and [13] .
Although large cardinal axioms do not provide an Ω-complete picture of Σ 2 1 it turns out that one can attain such a picture provided one supplements large cardinal axioms. Remarkably, one can do this by adding CH. Theorem 2.15 (Woodin [20] ). Assume ZFC and that there is a proper class of measurable Woodin cardinals. Then ZFC + CH is Ω-complete for Σ Moreover, up to Ω-equivalence, CH is the unique Σ Proof. Since ZFC + A is Ω-satisfiable, there is an ordinal α, a partial order P, and a V -generic G ⊆ P such that
Moreover, since Col(ω 1 , R) is countably closed it adds no new reals. Thus, since A is Σ 2 1 we have, by upward absoluteness,
Thus, ZFC+CH and ZFC+A are Ω-compatible. Since each theory is assumed to be Ω-complete for Σ (1) There is an axiom A such that (i) ZFC + A is Ω-satisfiable and (ii) ZFC + A is Ω-complete for the structure H(ω 2 ).
(2) Any such axiom A has the feature that
Thus, assuming that there is a proper class of Woodin cardinals and that the Strong Ω Conjecture holds, there is an Ω-complete picture of H(ω 2 ) and any such picture involves a failure of CH.
These two results raise the spectre of bifurcation at the level of CH. There are two key questions. First, are there recursive theories with higher degrees of Ω-completeness? Second, is there a unique such theory (with respect to a given level of complexity)? The answers to these questions turn on the Strong Ω Conjecture.
If there is a proper class of Woodin cardinals and the Strong Ω Conjecture holds then one cannot have an Ω-complete picture of third-order arithmetic.
Theorem 2.18 (Woodin).
Assume that there is a proper class of Woodin cardinals and that the Strong Ω Conjecture holds. Then there is no recursive theory A such that ZFC + A is Ω-complete for Σ It is open whether there is a recursively enumerable theory that is Ω-complete for Σ Jensen obtained a model of ZFC + CH + SH (and hence the failure of ♦) by iterated forcing over L. Later, Shelah obtained such models in the more general setting of proper-forcing iterations that do not add reals. In fact, in [1] it is shown that under ZFC + CH there is so much ambiguity at the level of Σ 2 2 that there is a small forcing that adds no new reals but adds a ∆ . See [23] . If the Ω Conjecture fails then it is possible that there is a recursively enumerable theory A and a large cardinal axiom L such that ZFC + L + A is Ω-complete for third-order arithmetic. In fact, it is possible that for each specifiable fragment V λ of the universe of sets there is a recursively enumerable theory and a large cardinal axiom L such that ZFC + L + A is Ω-complete for the theory of V λ . In other words, assuming the failure of the Ω Conjecture it is possible (given our current understanding) that there is an Ω-complete picture of arbitrarily large fragments of the universe of sets. If there were a unique such picture then this would make for a compelling case for new axioms that complete the standard axioms of set theory and constitute a realization of a variant of Gödel's conjectured completeness theorem. In the next section we will show that this optimistic scenario must fail; if there is one such Ω-complete picture then there must be another, incompatible Ω-complete picture.
Failure of Uniqueness
First, we need a precise specification of a large cardinal property, one that incorporates a key feature shared by customary large cardinal axioms, namely, invariance under small forcing. (Cf. Theorem 2.14.) Definition 3.1. A large cardinal property is a Σ 2 -formula ϕ(x) such that (as a theorem of ZFC) if κ is a cardinal and V ϕ[κ] then κ is strongly inaccessible and for all partial orders P ∈ V κ and all V -generics G ⊆ P,
This directly captures most of the standard large cardinal properties-for example, "κ is measurable", "κ is a Woodin cardinal", "κ is the critical point of a non-trivial elementary embedding j : V λ → V λ ". It does not capture "κ is supercompact" but it does capture "∃δ V δ κ is supercompact". Definition 3.2. Suppose ϕ is a large cardinal property. Let PC(ϕ) be the conjunction of the statements "there is a proper class of Woodin cardinals" and "there is a proper class of ϕ-cardinals".
Above we considered Ω-completeness relative to a fixed pointclass Γ (such as Σ 2 1 ) but now we shall be dealing with much larger fragments of the universe of sets and so it will be necessary to extend this definition.
Definition 3.3.
A sentence Φ is a specification if there is a least level V α that satisfies Φ and α > ω. Suppose Φ is a specification. Let V Φ denote the level specified by Φ. The sentence Φ is a robust specification if, in addition, for all partial orders P ∈ V Φ and for all V -generic G ⊆ P, in V [G] the ordinal specified by Φ is the same as the ordinal specified by Φ in V .
Remark 3.4. The robustness condition amounts to saying that for all P ∈ V Φ and for all V -generic G ⊆ P,
Some such robustness condition is necessary for our purposes. Fortunately, in the cases of interest this condition is met. For example, this is immediately true of large levels (such as the least level V α satisfying that there is a proper class of measurable cardinals) for any small forcing and we shall see that it is true of the small levels we consider for the particular forcing notions we employ.
Definition 3.5. Let Φ be a robust specification, let ϕ be a large cardinal property and let A be a recursively enumerable set of axioms. Then ZFC + A + PC(ϕ) is Ω-complete for Th(V Φ ) if for all sentences S of the language of set theory,
Notice again that we are including the degenerate case in that if ZFC + A + PC(ϕ) is Ω-inconsistent then it is Ω-complete for Th(V Φ ).
It will be of use to note the following reduction: Conditioning on a recursively enumerable theory A can be subsumed by conditioning on a single Σ 2 -sentence. For suppose ZFC + A + PC(ϕ) is Ω-complete for Th(V Φ ). Let ψ be the Σ 2 -sentence which asserts that there exists α such that V α |= ZFC + A + PC(ϕ). Then ZFC + ψ + PC(ϕ) is Ω-complete for Th(V Φ ). To see this suppose that β 1 and β 2 are ordinals and B 1 and B 2 are complete Boolean algebras such that V , respectively. By hypothesis,
which completes the proof. Theorem 3.6. Assume ZFC and that there is a proper class of Woodin cardinals. Suppose Φ is a robust specification, ϕ is a large cardinal property, and ψ is a Σ 2 -sentence such that
and ZFC + PC(ϕ) proves that there is a level satisfying Φ. Let P ∈ V Φ be a homogeneous partial order that is definable (without parameters) in V Φ and let ψ P be the Σ 2 -sentence:
There exists (κ, N, G) such that κ is strongly inaccessible,
.
Proof. In the statement of the theorem and in the proof we view P as presented by its definition. Thus, in a given a model M of ZFC, P M denotes P as calculated in M .
Without loss of generality we may assume that ZFC + ψ P + PC(ϕ) is Ω-satisfiable, otherwise there is nothing to prove. (In the cases of interest this condition will be met.)
Lemma. Suppose V B is a generic extension of V such that for some ordinal α, V B α ZFC + ψ P + PC(ϕ). Let (κ, N, G) be as in the definition of ψ P . Then, in V B , for each sentence S the following are equivalent (where, for notational convenience, we have written V for V B ) :
Proof. Some remarks on the notation are in order. First, in statements such as (4) the partial order P is computed via its definition in V Φ , while the latter is itself computed in various locations (in this case, rank initial segments of generic extensions of N ). Second, we are using "S ∈ Th(V Φ )" as shorthand for "either there is an infinite ordinal β such that V β Φ and, letting β be the least such ordinal, V β S, or there is no such ordinal and both Φ and S hold". This conditional formulation is needed to handle the case of local settings where V is V Φ . Let V B be a generic extension of V such that for some ordinal α, V B α ZFC + ψ P + PC(ϕ). Let S be a sentence. For notation convenience we shall write V for V B . Let (κ, N, G) be as in the definition of ψ P .
(1) ↔ (2): Since N ZFC + PC(ϕ) and V κ is a small generic extension of N it follows (by the invariance of large cardinal axioms under small forcing) that
But ZFC+PC(ϕ) proves that there is a level satisfying Φ. Since specifications are absolute across rank initial segments
In particular, taking S to be "S ∈ Th(V Φ )",
But since Φ is a robust specification,
and so it follows that N "1
Thus,
which completes the proof.
(3) ↔ (4): We first claim that
Suppose not. Since N satisfies that "ZFC + ψ + PC(ϕ)" is Ω-satisfiable it follows that there is a sentence S such that
and
However, by Theorem 2.2, N and V κ agree on Ω-logic (since V κ = N [G] and N satisfies ZFC and that there is a proper class of Woodin cardinals). So V κ agrees with N on the above two statements. So V must also satisfy these statements. But this is a contradiction since V satisfies that "ZFC + ψ + PC(ϕ)" is Ω-complete for Th(V Φ ). Now N also has levels satisfying "ZFC + ψ + PC(ϕ)" (since κ is strongly inaccessible). So the frozen theory must be (Th(V Φ ))
N . Thus, generally we have
and the equivalence of (3) and (4) is a special case. (5) ↔ (6): The right-to-left direction is immediate. For the other direction suppose for contradiction that
Since V satisfies that "ZFC+ψ +PC(ϕ)" is Ω-complete for Th(V Φ ), it follows that
However, V κ satisfies that "ZFC + ψ + PC(ϕ)" is Ω-satisfiable. Let Q ∈ V κ and α < κ be such that
By the previous displayed statement concerning V , it follows that
which is a contradiction.
The lemma ties the theory of V Φ as computed in V B to the Ω-consequence relation and so the generic invariance of the former is inherited from that of the latter. More precisely: Let B 1 and B 2 be complete Boolean algebras such that for some α 1 and α 2 , V
The first and third equivalence hold by the Lemma and the second equivalence holds by the generic invariance of Ω-logic. But PC(ϕ) proves that there is a Φ-cardinal and clearly
Thus, (Th(V Φ ))
In other words, ZFC + ψ P + PC(ϕ) is Ω-complete for Th(V Φ ).
Remark 3.7. In the statement of the above theorem we have not assumed that ZFC + ψ P + PC(ϕ) is Ω-satisfiable. Under appropriate large cardinal assumptions this theory is Ω-satisfiable and the theorem applies in a substantive way.
Theorem 3.8. Assume ZFC and that there is a proper class of Woodin cardinals. Suppose Φ is a robust specification such that the partial orders Add(ω 2 , ω) and Col(ω 1 , R) are definable in V Φ , ϕ is a large cardinal property, and ψ is a Σ 2 -sentence such that
and ZFC + PC(ϕ) proves that there is a level satisfying Φ. Then there is a Σ 2 -sentence ψ such that
and the first theory Ω-implies CH if and only the second theory Ω-implies ¬CH.
Proof. If ZFC + ψ + PC(ϕ) Ω CH then let P = Add(ω 2 , ω) and if ZFC + ψ + PC(ϕ) Ω ¬CH then let P = Col(ω 1 , R). Letting ψ be the Σ 2 -sentence ψ P from Theorem 3.6, we have
Remark 3.9. In the previous theorem one can work with H(ω 2 ) instead of V Φ . The reason is that P (in either case) is a homogeneous partial order that is definable over H(ω 2 ) and it has the feature that if G ⊆ P is V -generic then truth in H(ω 2 ) V [G] is reducible to truth in H(ω 2 ) V , which suffices for the proof of Theorem 3.6.
The above theorem is, of course, just a sample. One can replace CH by anything that can be forced with a definable, homogeneous partial order that satisfies the robustness condition. Thus, if there is one theory with the above degree of Ω-completeness then there is a "bifurcation" into a host of incompatible Ω-complete theories with the same degree of Ω-completeness.
The question of whether such a "bifurcation" can be obtained is sensitive to the Strong Ω Conjecture. On the one hand, if there is a proper class of Woodin cardinals and the Strong Ω Conjecture holds then by Theorem 2.18 there can be no Ω-complete theory for even third-order arithmetic (or even the Σ is a recursively enumerable theory that is Ω-complete for the theory of V λ . Should all such theories to agree on their common domain then this would make a strong case for new axioms completing the axioms of set theory. However, the above result shows that this will not happen. Instead there would be a radical "bifurcation" into a multitude of incompatible Ω-complete theories. 4 
Conclusion
There is evidence that the Ω Conjecture holds. There are two key points. First, many of the meta-mathematical consequences of the Ω Conjecture follow from the non-trivial Ω-satisfiability of the Ω Conjecture. This latter statement is a Σ 2 -statement and there are no known examples of Σ 2 -statements that are provably absolute and not settled by large cardinals. So it is reasonable to expect this statement to be settled by large cardinal axioms. Moreover, it seems unlikely that the Ω conjecture be false while its non-trivial Ω-satisfiability be true. Second, recent results have shown that if inner model theory can reach one supercompact cardinal then it can reach all of the traditional large cardinal axioms and, moreover, the Ω Conjecture holds in all of these models. This provides evidence that no traditional large cardinal can refute the Ω-satisfiability of the Ω Conjecture and (by the first point) this is evidence that the Ω Conjecture is true. Thus there is evidence that the above form of bifurcation will not occur. In fact, there is evidence that the Strong Ω Conjecture holds and thus there is evidence that bifurcation cannot even occur at the level of third-order arithmetic. 5 Nevertheless, even in the presence of the Ω Conjecture there are "local" bifurcations that one can consider. We close with a brief discussion. There are two settings in which one can consider local bifurcation.
The first setting is that of Theorem 2.15 which shows that (granting large cardinals) CH is a Σ 2 1 -sentence such that ZFC+CH is Ω-complete for Σ 2 1 and, moreover, that CH is the unique such sentence (up to Ω equivalence). We mentioned above that if the Strong Ω Conjecture holds then (granting large cardinals) there can be no recursively enumerable theory that is Ω-complete for Σ theory computed by ZFC + A in Ω-logic. The question of uniqueness simply asks whether T A is unique. A refinement of the results in this paper can be used to answer this question negatively. This lead to the natural question of how much variability there is among the T A . It is not known whether CH must belong to them all and a natural conjecture is that it must. Do some contain ♦ while others contain ¬♦? Do some contain SH (Suslin's hypothesis) while others contain ¬SH?
We shall address these questions in a sequel to this paper. But let us note the following: It is known (by a result of Woodin in 1985) that if there is a proper class of measurable Woodin cardinals then there is a forcing extension satisfying all Σ 2 2 sentences ϕ such that ZFC + CH + ϕ is Ω-satisfiable. (See [11] .) It follows that if the question of existence is answered positively with an A that is Σ 2 2 then T A must be this maximum Σ 2 2 theory and, consequently, all T A agree when A is Σ 2 2 . (A natural conjecture is that ♦ is such an A. But even if ♦ is not such an axiom A it will be in T A .) So, assuming that all such T A contain CH and that there is a T A where A is Σ 2 2 , then, although not all T A agree (when A is arbitrary) there is one that stands out, namely, the one that is maximum for Σ 2 2 sentences. The second setting is that of Theorem 2.17 which shows that (granting large cardinals and the Strong Ω Conjecture) there is an axiom A such that ZFC + A is Ω-complete for H(ω 2 ) and, moreover, any such axiom has the feature that ZFC + A Ω "H(ω 2 ) ¬CH". For each such axiom A let T A be the theory of H(ω 2 ) as computed by ZFC + A in Ω-logic. Thus, the theorem shows that all such T A agree in containing ¬CH. The question then naturally arises whether T A is unique. A refinement of the techniques of this paper can be used to answer this question negatively. But again, there is a T A that stands out, namely, the maximum theory given by the axiom ( * ). (See [22] .)
We shall prove the above localizations and explore the above questions in a sequel to this paper.
